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JURISDICTION
The Utah Supreme Court has original jurisdiction under U.C. A. § 78A-3-102(3)(j) and
transferred the case to the Court of Appeals pursuant to U.C.A. §78A-4-103(2)(j).
CONTROLLING CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES OR RULES
Rule 60(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure as cited by Plaintiff in her brief
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Appeal
Plaintiffs personal injury lawsuit for alleged injuries sustained in a car accident was

dismissed upon defendant's motion due to plaintiffs failure to properly prosecute her
lawsuit. The trial court then denied plaintiffs motion to set aside the dismissal of her case
after plaintiff failed to timely appear for oral argument on said motion. In support of its
denial of the motion to set aside under Rule 60(b), the court issued a seven page order
containing its findings of fact and conclusions of law.
B.

Course of the Proceedings
Plaintiff filed her complaint on November 15, 2006 for injuries allegedly sustained

in a car accident on December 3, 2002. From the beginning, plaintiff failed to comply with
the case's deadlines or to produce documents in response to defendants' numerous requests.
Ultimately, on November 5, 2007 defendants filed a motion for summary judgment due to
plaintiffs failure to produce evidence supporting her claims for injuries. (R. at p. 48).
1
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Plaintiff opposed the motion and swore in affidavit, that the delay in the case to that point
was due to her inaction on account of her father taking ill and passing away and some tax
issue never fully explained. (R. at p. 73).
The trial court denied the motion for summary judgment but admonished plaintiff that
"plaintiffs conduct in pursuit of her own lawsuit has been dilatory and often in derogation
of the scheduling order." (R. at pp. 100-104). The court further pointed out that "this is,
after all, [plaintiff's] lawsuit and that defendants also no doubtfindit extremely inconvenient
to be sued." Id. emphasis in original. Accordingly, the court granted an award of
defendants' attorney's fees in the amount of $1,372.50 for the motion. (R. at p. 114).
Plaintiff has never paid this sanction.
In the wake of the order granting sanctions, plaintiff finally provided her medical
records, however failed to produce her medical bills with those records. The parties also met
and executed an Amended Case Management Order under which fact discovery would be
completed by July 1,2008, expert discovery by October 30,2008 and trial would be set by
December 1, 2008. (R. at p. 118).
For their part, defendants complied with the management order. On January 15,2008,
defendants sent subpoenas to all of plaintiff s care providers. On March 8,2008, defendant
subpoenaed records of all of plaintiff s recent employers. On March 18,2008, defendants
deposed plaintiff. Per the expert discovery deadlines, on September 19, 2008, defendants
2
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designated an expert. Throughout this time, plaintiff did nothing of substance to move her
case forward. (R. at p. 124-130).
After months of silence from plaintiff, on June 1, 2009, defendants made one final
significant settlement offer to plaintiffs which was open until June 10,2009. (R, at p. 163).
When no response was received by the settlement offer deadline, defendants filed a motion
to dismiss on June 29, 2009. (R. at p. 164). Plaintiff failed to respond to the motion to
dismiss and the court granted the motion on August 13, 2009. (R. at p. 177).
To this point in the litigation, all correspondencefromplaintiff was through Mark (not
Matthew Graff) and all of plaintiff s filings were signed by Mark Graff On September 3,
2009, through new counsel, plaintiff filed her Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment and
Request for Hearing.1 (R. at p. 181).
A hearing was granted, but when plaintiff failed to timely appear, the trial court
upheld the dismissal with prejudice. (R. at p. 291). Plaintiff then filed a Second Motion to
Set Aside Order of Dismissal on March 24, 2010. (R. at p. 292). The trial court denied
plaintiffs second motion and issued a seven page order containing the court's finding of
facts and conclusions of law. (R. at p. 332).

1

Plaintiff labeled her motion as setting aside a default judgment, however the relief
sought was to set aside the court's order of dismissal. The court clarified this fact in its
Order dated June 4, 2010. (R. at p. 332).
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C

The Court's Order
In its June 4,2010 order (the "Order"), attached as Addendum I, the trial court clearly

states that it dismissed plaintiffs lawsuit due to lack of prosecution. (R. at p. 334). Using
its discretion under Rule 41 (b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the Order dismisses plaintiffs
case and addresses each issue raised by plaintiff in this appeal.
The Order first addresses plaintiffs arguments relating to Matthew Graff and the
requirement of a Notice to Appear or Appoint under Rule 74, U.R.C.P. The Order explains
that although plaintiff was not served well by Matthew Graffs involvement, the court
reviewed the pleadings in the case and found them to be signed by Mark Graff, who has had
no disciplinary proceedings against him. (R. at p. 333). The trial court stated:
Plaintiffs argument is unavailing because Mark Graff has at no time been
suspended, disbarred, or removed from the case. The pleadings and other
documents show Mark, not Matthew, Graff to have been principally involved
in this case. The undisputed unprofessional conduct on the part of Matthew
Graff in other matters does not automatically disqualify Mark Graff from
acting in this matter, and the Court can identify no rule that holds Mark Graff
should be considered to have been disqualified by association. Defendants
therefore had no duty to serve a notice that was not required by the rule.
(R. at p. 334, emphasis in original).
Similarly, the trial court's Order provides a lengthy explanation of its basis for
dismissing plaintiffs case pursuant to Rule 41(b), U.R.C.P., including supporting case law.
The Order starts by pointing out that "(f)rom the outset, the progress of this case has been
slow and halting" which caused the court to impose sanctions on plaintiff for her "dilatory
4
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discovery conduct" and that "Plaintiffs side has done very little to forward the case since
that time." (R. at p. 332). The Order further states "the Court finds that (plaintiffs) response
to her counsel's conduct was not reasonably diligent, that her opportunity of advancing the
case was equal to or greater than Defendants', and that she has in fact done a great deal less
than Defendants have to advance this matter." (R. at p. 335). The court finally points out
that "no dereliction on the part of the Graff firm explains Plaintiffs failure to appear at the
March 3, 2010 hearing" in which the court was to hold oral argument on plaintiffs motion
to set aside. (R. at p. 335).
The Order closes by addressing if plaintiff has shown "sufficient diligence" for relief
under Rule 60(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Applying the four factors laid out in
Cheap-O-Rooter, Inc. v. Marmalade Square Condo. Homeowners Ass 'n, 2009 UT App 329,
221 P.3d 898, the trial court stated "although the Court determines that Plaintiff has not acted
in bad faith, the danger of prejudice to Defendants is great and the length of delay has been
both unwarranted and disruptive of the judicial process." (R. at pp. 336-337).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Plaintiff appeals the trial court's denial of her motion pursuant to Rule 60(b), Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, to set aside the dismissal of her case. In denying plaintiffs request
for relief, the trial court issued the seven page Order setting forth its findings of facts and
conclusions of law. Plaintiffs statements that "there is simply nothing on the record to
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indicate what evidence the district court relied on or the legal basis for its denial of
Harrison's Rule 60(b) motion1' (Appellant's Brief at p. 18) or that "the district court's denial
of Harrison's Rule 60(b) Motion is devoid of any explanation" (Appellant's Brief at p. 24)
are simply incorrect.
The trial court correctly and thoughtfully weighed all the facts and factors of this case
and properly dismissed plaintiffs lawsuit due to her lack of diligence in prosecuting her
claims. The dismissal should be upheld.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT'S DENIAL IS WELL DOCUMENTED AND
SUFFICIENT.

Thefirstissue raised by plaintiff is the argument that the denial of her motion to set
aside is "legally deficient" without facts to support the dismissal The dismissal of an action
for plaintiffs failure to prosecute is within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not
be upset absent a showing of an abuse of discretion. Wilson v. Lambert, 613 P.2d 765 (Utah
1980).
In this case, the trial court thoughtfully and exhaustively laid out the facts of the
proceedings it took into consideration when it reached its decision to dismiss. The trial court
correctly showed the lengthy and continual dilatory manner in which plaintiff has failed to
prosecute her case. The trial court weighed the following factors: (1) the conduct of both
parties; (2) the opportunity each party has had to move the case forward; (3) what each party
6
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has done to move the case forward; (4) the amount of difficulty or prejudice that may have
been caused to defendants; and (5) most important, whether injustice may result from the
dismissal. Gillmor v. Blue Ledge Corp., 2009 UT App 320. (R. at pp. 334-335). Upon
weighing these factors, the trial court correctly dismissed plaintiffs lawsuit.
The trial court pointed out plaintiffs dilatory manner in prosecuting her case. It
factored in the previous sanction imposed against plaintiff for her failure to participate in the
case. Although plaintiffs brief seeks to blame Matthew Graff for her failure to prosecute
the case, at the time the trial court imposed sanctions, plaintifffiledher affidavit specifically
avowing that the delay was her fault due to her father's passing and a "tax issue". Despite
the sanction, plaintiff was given "a * second chance5 to pursue her case but has accomplished
very little toward doing so." (R. at p. 336).
Finally, the trial court attempted to give plaintiff a third chance at her lawsuit by
scheduling oral argument to discuss plaintiffs motion to set aside. Plaintiff failed to take
advantage of her third chance by failing to timely appear for the oral argument. In short,
plaintiff has had eight years since the accident and four years since thefilingofher complaint
to move this case forward and has failed to do so. The trial court graciously permitted
plaintiff three chances to reclaim control of her case and each time plaintiff failed to do so.
Because the trial court fully explained the basis of its decision to dismiss, it has not
abused its discretion and the trial courf s dismissal must not be upset.
7
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II.

MARK GRAFF, NOT MATTHEW GRAFF, WAS PLAINTIFF'S
COUNSEL, THEREFORE NO NOTICE TO APPEAR OR APPOINT
WAS REQUIRED.

Plaintiffs second issue presented on appeal is that no Notice to Appear or Appoint
wasfiledpursuant to Rule 74, U.R.C.P. upon Matthew Graffs suspension from the practice
of law. Despite plaintiff counsel's "affidavit" of what defendants and their counsel knew,
defendants were not aware of the suspension that was handed down just 12 business days
before theyfiledtheir motion to dismiss. In fact, the motion to dismiss wasfiledin response
to the unanswered settlement offer sent by defendants to plaintiff on June 1, 2009 (which,
in retrospect, was sent prior to Matthew Graffs suspension). Because plaintiff had not
prosecuted her case for quite some time, onefinalsettlement offer was made. When that
offer went unanswered for 2 weeks, defendantsfiledthe motion to dismiss. Defendants were
not aware that Matthew Graff had been suspended in the time between the settlement offer
and the motion for dismissal.
Moreover, as pointed out by the trial court's Order, the suspension of Matthew Graff
is irrelevant because he was not plaintiffs primary counsel; Mark Graff was. A quick review
of the court'sfileshows that every pleadingfiledon plaintiffs behalf is signed andfiledby
Mark Graff. Additionally, with the exception of one deposition, all of defense counsel's
communications in this case were with Mark Graff, not Matthew Graff.
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Rule 74(c) states that counsel must serve a Notice to Appear or Appoint when an
attorney dies, is suspended, disbarred or removedfromthe case. Despite Matthew Graffs
personal problems, the trial court correctly pointed out "Mark Graff has at no time been
suspended, disbarred, or removed from the case." (R. at p. 334). Because Mark Graff was
plaintiffs attorney and because Mark Graffwas not suspended or disbarred, defendants were
not required tofilea Notice to Appear or Appoint.
Because the trial court found "Defendants therefore had no duty to serve a notice that
was not required by the rule", it was within the trial court's discretion to dismiss plaintiffs
case pursuant to Rule 41 and deny relief under Rule 60(b). Because the trial court did not
abuse its discretion, the dismissal must stand.
CONCLUSION
The trial court dismissed plaintiffs lawsuit due to her failure to prosecute her claims.
Despite having been given three chances to push her case forward, plaintiff failed to do so.
After four years of dilatory conduct, the trial court granted dismissal. When plaintiff sought
to set aside the dismissal, she failed to timely appear for oral argument. Accordingly, the trial
court issued a seven page Order explaining the basis of its decision for upholding the
dismissal. Plaintiffs appeal fails to show the trial court abused its discretion, particularly in
light of the seven page Order. Because the trial court did not abuse its discretion, its
dismissal should not be upset.
9
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DATED this

day of December, 2010.
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C.

GREGORY J. SANDERS
PATRICK C. BURT
Attorneys for Appellees/Defendants
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
The undersigned hereby certifies that on the
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and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEES was mailed, first class,
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Aaron J. Prisbrey
Elizabeth B. Grimshaw
Aaron J. Prisbrey, PC
1090 East Tabernacle Street
St. George, Utah 84770
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant
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to Set Aside Order of Dismissal" dated June 4,2010

ADDENDUM A
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

)

')

7,'ilJ..'.-1* ™

5 : 1 1

IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT Y
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

EMBER HARRISON,

ORDER DENYING "PLAINTIFF'S
SECOND MOTION TO SET ASIDE
ORDER OF DISMISSAL"

Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. 060502164

TIFFANY THURSTON, et al.,
Judge Eric A. Ludlow
Defendants.

Before the Court is "Plaintiff s Second Motion to Set Aside Order of Dismissal." Having
considered the motion, memoranda, and other materials filed by the parties, the Court denies the
motion for the reasons discussed below.
FINDINGS OF FACT
From the outset, the progress of this case has been slow and halting. On January 9, 2008,
the Court entered an order imposing sanctions on Plaintiff for dilatory discovery conduct.
Despite the clear direction of the Court, Plaintiffs side has done very little to forward the case
since that time. In response to the order, Plaintiff finally provided her medical records and her
deposition was taken; however, she did not (1) produce the requested medical bills and
breakdown of medical expenses, (2) meet the deadlines of the amended scheduling order for
designating expert witnesses, or (3) respond to Defendants' efforts to settle this matter.
Plaintiff lays the blame for her failure to prosecute this matter entirely at the feet of her
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former counsel. Matthew T. Graff was suspended from the practice of law on June 9, 2009, and
a trustee was appointed to handle his remaining caseload. There is no doubt that Plaintiff was
not served well by Matthew Graffs involvement, whatever it was, in this matter. However, a
review of the documents in the Court's file reveals that the complaint was filed and signed by
Mark K Graff, not Matthew T. Graff. Furthermore, Mark Graffs signature (or what purports to
be his signature) appears on the stipulated scheduling order, the amended case management
order, Plaintiffs initial disclosures, the memorandum in opposition to summary judgment, and
various correspondence between counsel. The Court has not been made aware of any
disciplinary proceeding against Mark Graff.
The Court granted Defendants' unopposed motion to dismiss for Plaintiffs failure to
prosecute on August 13, 2009. Thereafter, Plaintiffs new counsel filed a "Motion to Set Aside
Default Judgment" on September 3,2009, to which Defendants responded with a memorandum
in opposition. Though the relief the motion seeks is technically unavailable- no default
judgment has in fact been entered in this matter- the Court granted Plaintiffs request for a
hearing on the motion. After neither Plaintiff nor new counsel appeared for the hearing
scheduled for March 4, 2010, the Court entered an order of dismissal. Later Plaintiff filed the
instant motion.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
A. Rule 74
Plaintiff argues that the fact that she received no Notice to Appear or Appoint Counsel
makes the dismissal inappropriate. Under Utah Rule of Procedure 74(c),
If an attorney ... is suspended from the practice of laAV, is disbarred, or is removed from

2
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the case by the court, the opposing party shall serve a Notice to Appear or Appoint
Counsel on the unrepresented party, informing the party of the responsibility to appear
personally or appoint counsel. A copy of the Notice to Appear or Appoint Counsel must
be filed with the court. No further proceedings shall be held in the case until 20 days after
filing the Notice to Appear or Appoint Counsel unless the unrepresented party waives the
time requirement or unless otherwise ordered by the court.
Plaintiffs argument is unavailing because Mark Graff has at no time been suspended, disbarred,
or removed from the case. The pleadings and other documents show Mark, not Matthew, Graff
to have been principally involved in this case. The undisputed unprofessional conduct on the
part of Matthew Graff in other matters does not automatically disqualify Mark Graff from acting
in this matter, and the Court can identify no rule that holds Mark Graff should be considered to
have been disqualified by association. Defendants therefore had no duty to serve a notice that
was not required by the rule.
B. Rule 41(b)
This matter was dismissed for lack of prosecution, not, as Plaintiff has sometimes argued,
under the standards applicable to default judgment. "It is well established that under Rule 41(b)
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, a trial court has the discretion to dismiss an action with
prejudice for failure to prosecute without justifiable excuse.1' Rohan v. Boseman, 2002 UT App
109, H 28 (citing Maxfieldv. Rushton, 779 P.2d 237, 239 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)). "The party
challenging the dismissal bears the burden of offering a reasonable excuse for [his or her] lack of
diligence." Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted; alteration in original). In making this
determination, the Court examines:
(1) the conduct of both parties; (2) the opportunity each party has had to move the case
forward; (3) what each party has done to move the case forward; (4) the amount of
difficulty or prejudice that may have been caused to the other side; and (5) most
important, whether injustice may result from the dismissal.

3
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Gillmor v. Blue Ledge Corp., 2009 UT App 230, ^[ 31 (quoting Country Meadows Convalescent
Or. v. Utah Dep't of Health, 851 P.2d 1212, 1215 (Utah Ct App. 1993)).
Reviewing the facts in this matter, the Court finds that Ms. Harrison's response to her
counsel's conduct was not reasonably diligent, that her opportunity of advancing the case was
equal to or greater than Defendants', and that she has in fact done a great deal less than
Defendants have to advance this matter. Citing telephone records showing the number of calls
she made over the course of several years to the Graff office, Plaintiff argues that she was as
diligent as she could be. She avers that she received "no response to the vast majority of [her]
phone calls and it was virtually impossible to find out about the status of [her] case from Mr.
Graffs office." Affidavit of Ember Harrison at *§ 4. Although the Court finds the negligent
conduct alleged on the part of former counsel to be extremely troubling, it must be noted that
"virtually impossible" is not the same thing as "impossible," and that Mr. Graff's office was not
the only source of information available to Ms. Harrison. Additionally, the lack of response to so
many calls over so long a period- particularly after sanctions had already been awarded because
of the lack of progress in discovery- should have at least put Plaintiff on notice that something
was amiss. Nothing in Ms. Harrison's affidavit indicates that these phone contacts should have
given her the false sense of security that her case was being attended to competently; rather, the
Court finds it more likely that these circumstances should have led a person seriously interested
in pursuing legal action to conclude the very opposite and to make inquiries from alternate
sources. Further, no dereliction on the part of the Graff firm explains Plaintiffs failure to appear
at the March 3,2010 hearing.
The years-long delay in this matter exacerbates the prejudice to Defendants and

4
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contributes to the risk of loss of witnesses' memories and physical evidence. Moreover, as
shown by the procedural history recited above, Defendants have been put to considerable trouble
and expense in this matter. Ms. Harrison has had a "second chance" to pursue her case but has
accomplished very little toward doing so. "Even where a trial court finds facts indicating that
'injustice could result from the dismissal of [a] case,' it can dismiss when a plaintiff has 'had
more than ample opportunity to prove his [or her] asserted interest and simply failed to do so/' 5
Country Meadows, 851 P.2d at 1216 (quoting Maxfieldv. Rushton, 779 P.2d at 240 (Utah App.
1989) (alterations in original)). "Such nonaction is inexcusable, not only from the standpoint of
the parties, but also because it constitutes abuse of the judicial process." Maxfield, 779 P.2d at
240-41.
C. Rule 60(b)
Finally, Plaintiff argues that her conduct amounts to "excusable neglect" under Utah Rule
of Civil Procedure 60(b). "[I]n deciding whether a party is entitled to relief under rule 60(b) on
the ground of excusable neglect, a district court must determine whether the moving party has
exercised sufficient diligence that it would be equitable to grant him relief from the judgment
entered as a result of his neglect." Jones v. Layton/Okland, 2009 UT 39, \ 25. The test for
"sufficient diligence" is analytically similar to the "reasonable excuse" inquiry under Rule 41:
Four factors are relevant to the inquiry: "[i] the danger of prejudice to [the nonmoving
party], [ii] the length of the delay and its potential impact on judicial proceedings, [iii] the
reason for the delay, including whether it was within the reasonable control of the
movant, and [iv] whether the movant acted in good faith."
Cheap-O-Rooter, Inc. v. Marmalade Square Condo, Homeowners Ass'n, 2009 UT App 329, \ 12
(quoting West v. Grand County, 942 P.2d 337,340-41 (Utah 1997)). For the reasons more fully
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discussed above, the Court does not find that Plaintiff's actions have been sufficiently diligent to
invoke equity in this matter. Further, although the Court determines that Plaintiff has not acted
in bad faith, the danger of prejudice to Defendants is great and the length of delay has been both
unwarranted and disruptive of the judicial process.
"Plaintiffs Second Motion to Set Aside Order of Dismissal" is therefore DENIED.
Dated this

&
Ige Eric A. Ludlow
Fifth District Court
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING/DELIVERY

1 hereby certify that on this M

day of

\l\jujdlj

, 2010,1 provided a true and

correct copy of the foregoing ORDER to each of the parties/attorneys named below by placing a
copy in such attorney's file in the Clerk's Office at the Fifth District Courthouse in St. George,
Utah and/or by placing a copy in the United States Mail, first-class postage prepaid, and
addressed as follows:
Aaron J. Prisbrey
Elizabeth B. Grimshaw
AARON J. Prisbrey, P.C.
1090 East Tabernacle Street
St. George, Utah 84770
Gregory J. Sanders
Patrick C. Burt
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, PC
10 Exchange Place, 4lh Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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